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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Meta-Emotions in Daily Life: Associations with Emotional Awareness and Depression
by
Natasha M. Haradhvala
Master of Arts in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Renee J. Thompson, Chair
Meta-emotions are emotions that occur in response to other emotions (e.g., guilt about
anger). Although preliminary evidence indicates that depression is associated with a greater
likelihood of meta-emotions, much remains unknown about meta-emotions, including how
regularly they are experienced and whether emotional awareness constructs (including attention
to and clarity of emotion) influence their occurrence. In the present study, we aim to establish
norms for meta-emotions in everyday life, determine whether increased emotional awareness is
associated with a greater likelihood of meta-emotions, and examine whether negative emotions
about negative emotions (negative-negative meta-emotional experiences) are associated with
depressive severity. We recruited an adult community sample (n=79) to complete seven days of
experience sampling. At each survey, they indicated current attention to emotion, clarity of
emotion, and whether and what kind of meta-emotional experience they were having.
Experiences were categorized as negative-negative, negative-positive, positive-positive or
negative-negative. Approximately 53% of participants reported at least one meta-emotional
experience. Meta-emotional experiences were reported about twice a week; negative-negative
experiences were most frequent. Although attention to and clarity of emotion each individually
predicted the likelihood of meta-emotional experiences, only attention to emotion contributed
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unique variance. Using multi-level modeling, we found that higher self-reported depressive
severity was associated with the likelihood of meta-emotional experiences and specifically with
negative-negative experiences. Findings indicate that most adults experience meta-emotions,
especially during moments of high attention to emotion, and that negative-negative experiences
are associated with depressive severity. These findings suggest that treatments for depression
would benefit from emphasizing acceptance of negative emotions.
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Introduction

“For a moment he felt good about this. A moment or two later he felt bad about feeling good
about it. Then he felt good about feeling bad about feeling good about it and, satisfied, drove on
into the night.” ― Douglas Adams, So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish

Meta-emotions, or secondary emotions that occur in response to other primary emotions
(Jäger & Banninger-Huber, 2015; Jäger & Bartsch, 2006; Mendonça, 2013),1 have been
theorized by researchers to be a distinct component of emotional experience (Jäger & Bartsch,
2006; Bartsch, Appel, & Storch., 2010; Hofmann, 2013; Mendonça, 2013; Mitmansgruber et al.,
2009; Norman & Furnes, 2016; Tomkins & McCarter, 1964) and in some cases associated with
psychopathology (Leahy, 2002; Mitmansgruber, 2009; Shaver et al., 2013). A meta-emotional
experience is composed of negative or positive primary and secondary emotions, such that the
object of the secondary emotion is the primary emotion (Norman & Furnes, 2016). If, for
example, a person feels guilty in response to feeling excited, we will describe that experience

1

We use the most common definition of meta-emotions (Jäger & Banninger-Huber, 2015; Jäger & Bartsch, 2006;

Mendonça, 2013), but is not the only one. Gottman, Katz, and Hooven (1996) originally coined the term “metaemotion” to refer to parents’ emotions and beliefs regarding their own emotions and their children’s emotions. In
contrast, others define meta-emotions as a set of beliefs about primary emotional processes (e.g., Beer & Moneta,
2010; Ferrari & Koyama, 2002). Bartsch (2008; 2010) conceptualizes them as evaluative cognitions and emotions
about one’s primary emotions, and Hofer and Wirth (2012) view them as emotions that are generated as the result of
an evaluative appraisal of one’s primary emotions. Koven (2011) sees them as a set of strategies used to act on
emotional information.
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hereafter as a negative-positive (NP) meta-emotional experience. Meta-emotional experiences
can also take negative-negative (NN), positive-negative (PN), or positive-positive (PP) forms
(Tomkins & McCarter, 1964).
However, relatively little is known about meta-emotional experiences. No study thus far
has empirically examined, for example, the frequency of meta-emotional experiences in daily
life. We expect that most people will experience meta-emotions. In particular, we expect that NN
and PP meta-emotional experiences will be more frequently reported than PN and NP
experiences. When regulating their emotions, people most frequently aim to maximize pleasure
by maintaining or increasing positive emotions and eliminating or decreasing unpleasant ones
(Riediger et al., 2009). Meta-emotions might serve this emotion regulatory function. For
example, positive emotions about positive emotions might serve as positive reinforcement for
positive primary emotions, and negative emotions about negative emotions might serve as
punishment for primary negative emotions. In this framework, PN and NP are contra-hedonic
and would involve more complex motivations.
Not only is it unknown how many people and how regularly people experience metaemotions, but also which other psychological variables are associated with their occurrence. In
particular, we explore how emotional awareness and depression severity are associated with the
occurrence of meta-emotions. We believe that as a result of this endeavor we will be better
situated to assess the role of meta-emotions in emotional experience as a whole and depression in
particular.
Meta-Emotions and Emotional Awareness
Norman and Furnes (2016) theorized that meta-emotions are closely tied to people’s
declarative knowledge of their own emotional processes, or what they termed meta-emotional
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knowledge. One aspect of meta-emotional knowledge is emotional awareness. Emotional
awareness is composed of multiple dimensions, including attention to emotion and clarity of
emotion—conceptually related but distinct constructs (Boden & Thompson, in press). Attention
to emotion is the degree to which one attends to one’s emotions (Salovey et al., 1995), and
clarity of emotion is how clearly one understands one’s emotions (Gohm & Clore, 2000). Given
that attention to and clarity of emotion both involve a degree of insight into one’s own emotional
life, it is fitting that they would be associated with—and perhaps even prerequisite to—metaemotional experiences.
Some preliminary research supports the hypothesis that meta-emotions will be positively
related to trait attention to emotion. Mitmansgruber et al. (2009) examined how meta-emotional
experiences, assessed using the trait Meta-Emotion Scale (MES), were related to mindful
attention and awareness, which is a similar construct to attention to emotion. In this study,
mindful attention and awareness was negatively related to negative meta-emotions (a
combination of NN and NP meta-emotional experiences) and positively related to positive metaemotions (a combination of PN and PP meta-emotional experiences). However, the MES
assessment of meta-emotions includes the assessment of emotion regulation strategies and
cognitive appraisals of emotions, so it is important for research to delineate how emotional
awareness variables relate specifically to meta-emotions. Mitmansgruber et al. (2009) did not
explore clarity of emotion in relation to meta-emotions, but we hypothesized that it is not only
attention to, but also understanding of, one’s emotions that is associated with meta-emotional
experiences.
Mitmansgruber et al. (2009) provided evidence demonstrating important individual
differences in the experience of meta-emotional knowledge and experiences. However, because
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people are not likely to experience meta-emotions all the time, it is also important to examine
which aspects of people’s in vivo emotional experience are related to the occurrence of metaemotions. We hypothesize that people are most likely to have meta-emotional experiences during
moments of high attention to emotion and clarity of emotion. Although Mitmansgruber et al.
(2009) examined subtypes of meta-emotional experience, we examine the association between
the two dimensions of emotional awareness and meta-emotional experiences in general. We
theorize there is a more over-arching relation: that in order to experience and report emotions
about other emotions (independent of valence), individuals must be paying attention to their
emotions and be clear about what their emotions are.
Meta-Emotions and Depression
Two studies have examined the relation between meta-emotions and depression, and
their findings suggest that further research is warranted. In a sample of university students,
Mitmansgruber (2009) found that severity of depressive symptoms was positively correlated
with negative meta-emotions (i.e., a combination of NN and NP) and negatively correlated with
positive meta-emotions (i.e., a combination of PN and PP). In an adult sample of psychotherapy
patients recruited from a clinic, Leahy (2002) found that depressive symptom severity was
related to higher levels of a specific type of meta-emotional experience that involved guilt,
shame, and embarrassment about other (negative or positive) emotions. Because Mitmansgruber
(2009) used a broad conceptualization of meta-emotions (including emotion regulation
strategies), and Leahy (2002) only assessed meta-shame, guilt and embarrassment, more research
is needed in order to explore the relation between depression and the subtypes of meta-emotional
experiences.

4

Emotional non-acceptance, which occurs when an individual negatively judges his or her
own negative emotions (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), is conceptually similar to meta-emotion and
has also been linked to depression (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006; Ehring et al., 2008; Ehring et al.,
2010; Flynn, Hollenstein, & Mackey, 2010; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999; Mennin
et al., 2007; Neumann et al., 2009; Sauer-Zavala et al., 2007). NN meta-emotional experience
can almost be viewed as an example of non-acceptance, but the definition of non-acceptance
often includes cognitive appraisals of emotions (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Several existing
treatments for depression, the most well-known of which is acceptance and commitment therapy
(Hayes et al., 1999), incorporate acceptance of distress and negative emotion as a key component
to recovery.
Importantly, research on meta-emotions can provide information above and beyond what
can be gleaned from research on constructs such as emotional non-acceptance. For example, the
non-acceptance literature only examines a construct similar to NN, not NP. There is evidence,
however, that depressed individuals dampen positive emotions (Feldman et al., 2008; Nelis,
Holmes, & Raes, 2015; Werner-Seidler et al. 2013). This means that depressed individuals tend
to “respond to positive moods states with mental strategies to reduce the intensity and duration of
the positive mood state” (Feldman et al., 2008, p. 509). As suggested above, negative metaemotions could play a regulatory function; if so, the dampening literature would indicate
depressed individuals might experience not only NN meta-emotional experiences, but NP
experiences, as well.
If both NN and NP are associated with depression, this knowledge could help tailor
acceptance-based treatments to be more accurate and helpful via the inclusion of acceptance of
positive emotions. Furthermore, the non-acceptance literature does not address feeling positively
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about one’s emotions (i.e., PP and PN meta-emotions). If people who tend to feel positively
about their emotions experience lower levels of depression, this could point to the protective role
of positive secondary emotions and inform the course of treatment.
The Current Study
Existing research examining meta-emotions has used one of three global self-report
measures. None of the existing measure assesses the full spectrum of NN, PN, PP, and PN metaemotional experiences, while excluding phenomena such as cognitive appraisals of emotion.
Consequently, the present study used experience sampling methodology (ESM) to explore the
meta-emotional experiences in the daily lives of a diverse group of adults recruited from the
community. In addition to assessing the full range of meta-emotional experiences, ESM allows
our participants to report in the moment and in a naturalistic setting. This method also obviates
the need for participants to take on the daunting task of recalling and categorizing every metaemotional experience over a much longer period of time.
The purpose of the study was threefold. Firstly, we aimed to establish the frequency of
meta-emotions and meta-emotional experience subtypes in daily life. We hypothesized that the
majority of individuals would report meta-emotional experiences. With regard to meta-emotional
experience subtypes, we expected that NN and PP meta-emotional experiences would be more
frequently reported than PN and NP experiences. Secondly, we aimed to determine whether
higher levels of state clarity of emotion and state attention to emotion are associated with the
likelihood of someone experiencing meta-emotions. Thirdly, we aimed to identify whether
depressive symptoms are associated with the likelihood of certain types of meta-emotional
experience. We hypothesized that NN and NP meta-emotional experiences would be the only
subtypes of meta-emotional experience positively associated with depression. This would
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indicate that the secondary emotion is the operative component that predicts negative outcomes,
regardless of the valence of the primary emotion. These goals have direct clinical implications,
as the better we understand who experiences meta-emotions, how frequently, and under what
conditions, the more we can add to the knowledge base built by the non-acceptance literature to
enhance and refine existing treatments for depression.

Method
Participants
Participants were 88 adults recruited from the St. Louis community as part of a broader
study on emotional experience. In order to recruit a representative sample of the community,
individuals were recruited through advertisements posted online and at local businesses, and
were screened based on age, sex, race/ethnicity, and income. All participants were native English
speakers, United States citizens, and at least 18 years old. Exclusionary criteria included active
psychosis and current substance abuse or dependence. In addition, because participation in the
broader study included assessment of peripheral psychophysiology and inflammatory markers,
participants with certain health conditions (e.g., rheumatoid arthritis), who were taking certain
medications (e.g., beta-blockers), had a body mass index of 32 or higher, or were currently
pregnant or breastfeeding were ineligible to participate. Seven participants’ ESM data were
unusable due to technical difficulties, and two participants withdrew from the study before
completing the full week of ESM surveys. The final sample of 79 participants was 58.2% female
(n = 46) and ranged in age from 20-71 (M = 39.0, SD = 14.5). Ethnic breakdown was 65.8%
white (n = 52), 21.5% Black/African American (n = 17), 7.6% biracial (n = 6), 3.8%
Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 3), and 1.3% Middle Eastern (n = 1). A total of 3.8% of participants
(n = 3) identified as Hispanic. A total of 3.9% of the sample had less than or up to a high school
7

education; 20.3% had attended some college; 54.4% had a college degree; and 21.5% had a
professional degree.
Procedure
For the parent study, participants completed two laboratory sessions that were scheduled
approximately a week apart during which they completed seven days of ESM. At their first
session, participants provided informed consent and completed a series of self-report measures
and computerized tasks that were unrelated to the current study. At this session, they were also
instructed individually on the ESM protocol. During this tutorial, the experimenter went through
each survey item, providing instruction and answering participants’ questions. Each participant
also completed a practice trial with the experimenter.
For the ESM protocol, participants were instructed to carry with them at all times an iOSbased electronic device—either their own iPhone or a 4th generation iPod touch that was
provided to them. The survey iOS app, SurveyApp, which was installed by an experimenter onto
the device beforehand, was designed to collect data offline throughout the sampling period so
that it did not require Wi-Fi or a data plan. Participants’ devices were programmed to prompt
them eight times per day on each of the seven days during a 12-hour window of the participant’s
choice (e.g., 8am to 8pm), totaling 56 surveys over the course of the week. Prompts occurred at
random times within eight 90-minute windows per day. Participants had up to 10 minutes to
respond to each survey before it expired and data were recorded as missing. The mean
percentage of surveys completed was 72.4% (SD = 20.8%).
After approximately a week after the first laboratory session, participants returned for the
second laboratory session. They completed a series of self-report measures and computerized
tasks (those which are related to the present study are described below). Finally, participants
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were verbally debriefed and compensated for their participation, with an extra incentive for
responding to more than 90% of the prompts. The research protocol was approved by
Washington University in St. Louis’ Institutional Review Board.
ESM measures.
Meta-emotional experiences. Meta-emotional experiences were assessed at each ESM
survey. After participants rated the extent to which they felt a series of emotions, they were
asked the following question: “You just finished reporting how you were feeling at the time of
the beep. Are you also experiencing any feelings in response to any of the feelings?” They could
respond yes or no. If they responded yes, they were asked to use the keyboards on their devices
to fill in the two blanks in the following sentence: “I feel ___________ about feeling
____________.” These responses were later coded (details described below).
Great care was taken in instructing participants on the meta-emotional experience items
during the individual, in-person tutorial at the first laboratory session. During this tutorial,
participants were asked to think of a time when they experienced feelings in response to other
feelings. If participants had difficulty doing so, the research team member offered the following
NP example of a meta-emotional experience: “You might imagine someone who feels happy that
a coworker did not get a promotion because she thought the person did not deserve it. However,
you might imagine that this person who feels happy also then feels guilty or bad about feeling
happy about someone’s misfortune.” The participant was then prompted for another example. If
the participant had difficulty or provided exactly the same subtype of experience (i.e. NP), the
research team member offered a second example, this time NN: “You might imagine someone
who gets angry at someone for interrupting them when they are talking. This person may feel
worried about being angry about something seemingly small.” When participants demonstrated

9

that they understood the concept of meta-emotional experiences, including providing their own
example, they were guided through answering the prompt “I feel ______________ about feeling
________________.”
The responses to the meta-emotional experience item were text-based (e.g., “I feel angry
about feeling sad”). Two trained undergraduate raters independently coded each response for (a)
whether it was a feeling state, and (b) if so, whether the feeling state was positive or negative. If
each word in the entry was a feeling state, the raters coded the entry as a meta-emotional
experience. In order to standardize the procedure by which words were rated, we used Shaver’s
(1987) list of feeling states as a coding reference. Shaver’s original list includes 135 feeling
states and identifies them as either positive (e.g., relief, delight, pride) or negative (e.g.,
hopelessness, dread, irritation). This list in its original form, while extensive, was not, for the
purposes of the current study, sufficient. We modified it in three ways. Firstly, Shaver’s list only
includes nouns, while our prompt implicitly solicited adjectives, so we accepted adjectival forms
of the nouns on the list (e.g., hopeless instead of hopelessness) as feeling states. Secondly, we
added words that were direct synonyms of words already on the list, including adjectives that did
not have a noun form but that are synonymous with the adjectival form of a noun that is on the
list (e.g., mad, because it is synonymous with angry). Finally, we added words that showed poor
understanding of the exact type of emotion the participant was feeling, but still clearly
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represented positive or negative emotion (e.g., good, bad, terrible). Our final list contained 159
feeling states.2, 3
Coding meetings were held so that coders could discuss any disagreements and come to
a consensus. An analysis of inter-rater reliability showed near-perfect agreement between the
coders: k = .99 for whether each entry was a meta-emotional experience, and k = .96 for the
particular subtype of meta-emotional experience. Consensus ratings were used in the present
analysis. From these ratings, several variables were computed. First, a binary variable was
computed to indicate whether the response qualified as a meta-emotional experience.4 Next, four
binary variables were computed to indicate whether the meta-emotional experience met criteria
for any of the four subtypes (NN, NP, PN, or PP).

2

If a feeling state was negated (e.g. “not happy”), we did not code the entry as a feeling state. This is because

although we knew which emotion the participant was not experiencing, we did not have enough information to
judge which emotion, if any, they were experiencing. If, for example, two positive words that would otherwise be
coded as feeling states were entered into one blank, the entry was coded as a positive feeling state. However, if one
positive and one negative word that would each otherwise have been coded as feeling states were entered into one
blank (e.g. “happy and sad”) we did not code the entry as a feeling state.
3

The 24 feeling states we included in addition to those on Shaver’s list were as follows: accomplishment, angst,

bad, bothered, calm, chilling, concerned, discontent, dissatisfied, foolish, good, humored, mad, mean, positive,
ridiculous, scared, silly, sour, stress, terrible, uncomfortable, unsettled, and upset.
4

35.9% of responses to the meta-emotion question were excluded because they were not coded as true meta-

emotional experiences. Of these excluded responses, the majority of mentioned physical states (e.g., hunger; 32.4%)
or cognitive or behavioral states (e.g., productivity; 31.5%) instead of feeling states for at least one word in the
response.
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Attention to emotion. Attention to emotion was assessed at each ESM survey with two
items. Participants were asked to rate each item on a five-point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 4 = a
great deal). The first item (“At the time of the beep, I was paying attention to how I was
feeling”) is the item with the highest factor loading on the Attention to Feelings subscale of the
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) and has
been used and validated in previous ESM research (Thompson et al., 2011). The second item (“I
found myself paying attention to my feelings even though I did not intentionally try to do so”) is
the item with the highest factor loading on a scale measuring involuntary attention to emotion
(Huang, Berenbaum & Chow, 2013). Both items were modified by adding “at the time of the
beep” and changing the sentence structure to past tense. Reliability for these items, averaged
across prompts within participants, was .98. This reliability estimate is analogous to Cronbach’s
alpha for items in self-report measures.
Clarity of emotion. Clarity of emotion was assessed at each ESM survey with two items
using the same five-point Likert scale as the attention to emotion items. The first item (“At the
time of the beep, I was clear about my feelings”) is the item with the highest factor loading on
the Clarity in Discrimination of Feelings subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS;
Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The second item (“At the time of the beep, I
would have had to think for a while to figure out who (or what) made me feel the way I was
feeling”) was adapted from the two highest-loading items on a scale assessing source awareness
(Berenbaum, 2011). The specific feeling states listed in each item (“sad, angry, or scared” and
“happy or excited,” respectively) were replaced with the more general phrase “the way I was
feeling.” Both clarity of emotion items in our ESM survey were modified by adding “at the time
of the beep” and changing the sentence structure to past tense. Reliability for these items,
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averaged across prompts within participants, was .98. This reliability estimate is analogous to
Cronbach’s alpha for items in self-report measures.
Clinical measures.
Depression. Severity of depressive symptomatology was assessed using the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) during participants’ second
visit to the lab. Twenty items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = rarely or none of the time, 3
= most or all of the time) and assess symptomatology during the past week; higher scores
indicate greater symptomatology. The CES-D was designed to assess depression in community
samples (Radloff, 1977) and has demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity
(Milette et al., 2010). The internal consistency of the CES-D items was high in this sample
(Cronbach’s  = .90). Our sample had a mean CES-D score of 12.44 (SD = 9.51; range = 0-44).
Because elevated symptoms on the CES-D do not necessarily indicate the presence of a major
depressive episode, we invited a subset of participants to complete the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5-RV; First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2014) to assess their
current and past mental health history. Interviews were conducted by one of three graduate
students who had completed an assessment course in which they learned to administer the SCID.
All interviews were audio recorded and coded by a second graduate student. Any diagnostic
disagreements were discussed at regular group meetings, which were supervised by the last
author, a licensed clinical psychologist. Inter-rater reliability for the presence of a current
depressive disorder was k = .80. Five of the 13 participants interviewed, or at least 6.3% of the
total sample, were diagnosed with a current depressive disorder (four with major depressive
disorder (MDD), one with persistent depressive disorder). This illustrates that the range of
depressive symptoms in the current sample included clinical levels of depression.
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Data Analytic Plan
Our data plan involved two steps. First, we calculated frequencies and descriptive
statistics to examine various characteristics of our participant pool. We then calculated the
percentage of surveys at which participants reported any type of meta-emotional experience, and
calculated whether that frequency varied as a function of different demographic variables. Next,
we calculated frequencies and descriptive statistics of all meta-emotional experience subtypes.
(For correlations between attention to emotion, clarity of emotion, and depression variables, see
Table 1 below.) All meta-emotional experience variables were subject to an arcsine
transformation, which was selected for its ability to accommodate proportional data when
correcting for skewness. We used SPSS v23, IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 2016, to analyze
all descriptive data.
Second, we used multilevel modeling (MLM) to investigate the hypotheses for clarity of
emotion, attention to emotion, and depressive symptom severity. We conducted a series of
multilevel models to account for the hierarchical structure of the data (i.e., beeps nested within
individuals; Nezlek, 2012). MLM was the most appropriate choice for these analyses because it
does not assume independence of data, as does regression: that is, it takes into account the fact
that the relations between within-person variables might vary from individual to individual.
Furthermore, MLM is able to account for missing data and varying time intervals between beeps.
Because our outcomes were binary (i.e., meta-emotion was either present or absent), we used
hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM) with the binomial distribution as the sampling
model at Level 1 and the logit function to transform predicted values. Thus, our predictors are
reported on the logit scale, meaning they represent the natural log of the odds of the probability
of experiencing meta-emotion. The logit values can be exponentiated to transform them into
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probabilities, which we did across a range of values for predictors that were significantly
associated with the likelihood of meta-emotional experiences. The analyses were run using the
“lme4” package (Bates et al., 2015) in the program R v3.2.3 (The R Foundation for Statistical
Computing for Mac, 2015).
In the equations for the MLM models below, subscript i represents surveys and subscript
j represents individual participants. All within-person predictors were person-mean centered.
There are no Level 1 (within-person) random error terms because the variance is known at Level
1 of HGLM models. u represents the Level 2 (between-person) random error term.
Results
Frequency of Meta-Emotional Experiences
A total of 53.2% (n = 42) of the participants reported at least one meta-emotional
experience over the course of the one-week ESM period. On average, participants reported metaemotional experiences at 5.7% of their surveys (SD = 9.1%, range = 0-41%). The frequency of
meta-emotional experiences did not differ by gender, t(77) = 0.80, p = .43, and was not
significantly associated with age, r = -0.11, p = .22. With regard to race, we limited analyses to
the two largest racial groups, Black/African American and white, which composed
approximately 80% of our sample; participants did not differ in frequencies of meta-emotions as
a function of race, t(67) = 0.11, p = .74. Frequencies of meta-emotions also did not vary by
education, F(5, 73) = 0.65, p = .66.
With regard to meta-emotional experience subtypes, 45.6% (n = 36) reported at least one
NN meta-emotional experience (M = 4.2% of surveys, SD = 7.1%, range = 0-31%). A total of
15.2% (n = 12) reported at least one NP meta-emotional experience (M = 0.7% of surveys, SD =
2.1%, range = 1-12%). Of our sample, 7.6% (n = 6) reported at least one PN meta-emotional
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experience (M = 0.2% of surveys, SD = 0.6%, range = 0-3%). A total of 17.7% (n = 14) reported
at least one PP meta-emotional experience (M = 0.7% of surveys, SD = 1.6%, range = 0-8%).
Hierarchical Linear Models
Attention to Emotion and Clarity of Emotion Predicting Likelihood of Meta-Emotional
Experiences
One of our models examined attention to emotion as a Level 1 predictor of metaemotional experiences:
Model 1
Level 1 (level of beeps):
Meta-Emotionij = β0j + β1j Attention to Emotion

(Equation 1a)

Level 2 (level of individuals):
β0j = 𝛾00 + u0j

(Equation 1b)

β1j = 𝛾10 + u1j

(Equation 1c)

Meta-Emotionij represents the likelihood (in logits) of having a meta-emotional
experience for participant j at beep i. At Level 1, β0j represents each participant’s mean
likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience at the person mean of attention to emotion; β1j
represents the change in the likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience per unit change in
attention to emotion for each participant. At Level 2, 𝛾00 represents the grand mean of the
likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience; 𝛾10 represents the change in the likelihood of
having a meta-emotional experience per unit change in attention to emotion for the entire
sample.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that attention to emotion was positively
associated with likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience, 01 = 1.32, SE = 0.21, p <
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.001. This suggests that higher state attention to emotion was related to a higher likelihood of
experiencing meta-emotions.
We then ran a model similar to Model,1 entering clarity of emotion as a Level 1 predictor
instead of attention to emotion. Also consistent with our hypothesis, we found that clarity of
emotion was positively associated with likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience, 01 =
1.18, SE = 0.30, p < .001. This suggests that, as with attention to emotion, higher state clarity of
emotion was related to a higher likelihood of experiencing meta-emotions.
Lastly, we ran a model similar to Model 1, entering attention to emotion, clarity of
emotion, and their interaction as Level 1 predictors. Attention to emotion was positively
associated with the likelihood of a meta-emotional experience, 01 = 1.18, SE = 0.24, p < .001.
However, clarity of emotion was not significantly associated with the likelihood of having a
meta-emotional, 01 = 0.65, SE = 0.47, p = .16. This suggests that attention to emotion, but not
clarity of emotion, is uniquely related to a higher chance of experiencing meta-emotions. The
attention to emotion by clarity of emotion interaction term was not significant, 01 = -0.10, SE =
0.29, p = .74.
Severity of Depressive Symptoms Predicting Likelihood of Meta-Emotional Experiences
Next, we ran a series of models in which the likelihood of experiencing meta-emotions
was predicted by severity of depressive symptoms. We first ran a model with depressive
symptom severity as a Level 2 predictor of whether someone would have any type of metaemotional experience:
Model 2
Level 1 (level of beeps):
Meta-Emotionij = β0j

(Equation 2a)
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Level 2 (level of individuals):
β0j = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01Depression + u0j

(Equation 2b)

As in Model 1, Meta-Emotionij represents the likelihood (in logits) of having a metaemotional experience for participant j at beep i. Depression was grand-mean-centered. At Level
1, β0j represents each participant’s mean likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience. At
Level 2, 𝛾00 represents the grand mean of the likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience
at the grand mean of depressive symptom severity; 𝛾01 represents the change in the likelihood of
having a meta-emotional experience per unit change in depressive symptom severity.
Depressive symptom severity was positively associated with likelihood of having a metaemotional experience, 01 = 0.05, SE = 0.02, p < .05. Figure 1 displays this association after we
have transformed the logit model back to the original probability metric. We then ran four
models similar to Model 2 but with each of the specific subtypes of meta-emotional experience
as our outcome variables. Our hypothesis that depressive symptoms would be associated with
NN and NP meta-emotional experiences was partially supported: depressive symptom severity
was positively associated with the likelihood of having a NN meta-emotional experience;
however, depressive symptom severity did not predict any of the other three subtypes of metaemotional experience, including NP (see Table 2).
Discussion
The theoretical role of meta-emotions in emotional experience has been explored in the
literature, and there is preliminary evidence of their association with depression. In this study, we
examined the frequency of meta-emotional experiences in everyday life. We tested whether
meta-emotional experiences would be more likely during moments of high emotional awareness,
as measured by both attention to emotion and clarity of emotion. We also examined whether
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higher levels of depression would be associated with a higher likelihood of having NN and NP
meta-emotional experiences.
This is the first study to assess frequency of meta-emotional experiences in a community
sample. Approximately half (53%) of the participants reported at least one meta-emotional
experience during a period of a week. Further, on average, meta-emotional experiences were
reported at 5.6% of surveys, which translates into participants reporting them about two times
over the course of a week. This is noteworthy because participants were asked if they were
experiencing a meta-emotion at the time of the survey, not if they had experienced them during
the period of time since the last survey, meaning that the reported frequency of meta-emotional
experiences is likely a conservative one.
These findings indicate that meta-emotions are not only a matter of theoretical interest,
but that they might be salient in daily life for the majority of people. Importantly, the sample was
diverse with regard to race, ethnicity, education, and age, and our findings did not vary by these
key demographics. Our findings suggest that the experience of meta-emotions is a common and
wide-ranging phenomenon that cuts across demographic categories.
However, it is also important to acknowledge that 47% of our sample did not report metaemotional experiences. It is possible that some of these participants experienced meta-emotions,
but did not want to take the effort to report them (see discussion of limitations). Another
possibility is that meta-emotional experiences may occur more frequently during major life
events, such as a divorce or starting a new job, and that such instances were not captured during
random sampling. Future research could use event-contingent sampling, during which
participants are instructed to report meta-emotions whenever a stressful or noteworthy life event
occurs; perhaps a greater percentage of participants will report meta-emotions. Perhaps the
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simplest explanation, however, is that certain individuals do not experience meta-emotions.
Future research might explore why this might be: these individuals might, for example, have
been raised with parents who modeled acceptance of their child’s emotions instead of reacting
emotionally to their child’s emotions (Thomkins & McCarter, 1964).
Of the four subtypes of meta-emotional experiences, NN meta-emotional experiences
were the most frequently reported. That is, when people reported a meta-emotional experience,
they were typically experiencing negative emotions about their own negative emotions. People
reported, for example, feeling sad about feeling disappointed; feeling guilty about feeling
frustrated; and feeling anxious about feeling angry. PP meta-emotional experiences were the
second most commonly reported subtype. These findings support our hypothesis that NN and PP
meta-emotional experiences would be most frequently reported, and is in line with the hedonic
theory of emotion regulation (Riediger et al., 2009). In accordance with our hypothesis and the
hedonic theory of emotion regulation, the PN and NP subtypes were the least frequently
reported: during reported meta-emotional experiences, people were less likely to feel positively
about negative emotions or feel negatively about positive emotions.
In addition to documenting frequencies of meta-emotions, we examined how people’s
momentary levels of attention to and clarity of emotion were associated with the occurrence of
meta-emotions. Increased attention to emotion and clarity of emotion were each related to the
likelihood of having a meta-emotional experience, which is in line with our hypotheses. These
findings expand the literature examining how trait measures of attention to emotion
(Mitmansgruber et al., 2009) and clarity of emotion (Leahy, 2002) are related to the occurrence
of meta-emotional experiences. Our findings indicate that people who experience meta-emotions
do not experience them all of the time, but are more likely to experience them when they are
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paying more attention and are clearer about how they feel. However, it is still unclear whether it
is the state of heightened levels of attention to and clarity of emotion that leads to the
acknowledgement of meta-emotions, or whether the experience of meta-emotions leads to
heightened levels of attention to and clarity of emotion. We would conjecture that it is the
former: that individuals who are paying attention to and understand their emotions are more
likely to have and notice internal states such as meta-emotional experiences.
When we examined whether clarity of emotion and attention to emotion were uniquely
associated with meta-emotional experiences, only attention to emotion continued to be
significantly associated with meta-emotional experiences. We think there are two possible
explanations for this pattern of findings. Firstly, it is possible that the accuracy of self-reports of
clarity of emotion might be compromised by natural limitations on participants’ capacity for
introspection (Thompson et al., 2015). Supporting this theory, a study by Lischetzke, Angelova,
and Eid (2011) found that when participants were asked to make ratings of their emotions in the
moment, their reaction times to answer the questions (presumably a reflection of clarity of
emotion) were unrelated to global self-reports of emotional clarity. However, if clarity of
emotion scores were affected by capacity for introspection, it is doubtful that attention to
emotion scores would remain unaffected.
A second possibility is that we are observing a true effect, or that attention to emotion is
simply a better predictor of meta-emotional experiences. This would mean that paying attention
to what you are feeling is the key ingredient to experiencing emotions, even when one is unable
to identify exactly what type of emotion one is experiencing and why. This is also a plausible
theory: participants, when paying attention to their emotions, might understand that they are
having an emotional reaction to other emotions, while not completely understanding that
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reaction. Some participants were rather vague about their primary and meta-emotions (e.g., “I
feel negative about feeling bad”), suggesting these participants have a low degree of clarity of
emotion while still able to report meta-emotional experiences. However, it is less likely that
participants would be able to identify and report meta-emotional experiences if they were not
paying attention to their emotions in the first place.
In agreement with our hypothesis, the data showed that higher depression is associated
with higher likelihood of having NN meta-emotional experiences. However, other associations
between depression and meta-emotional experience subtypes, including NP, were not significant.
As noted, existing non-acceptance literature has found that feeling and thinking negatively
toward negative emotions is associated with depressive symptoms, supporting the hypothesized
relation between NN meta-emotional experiences and depression (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006;
Sauer-Zavala et al., 2007). Less support is available for the relation between NP meta-emotional
experiences and depression (Leahy, 2002; Mitmansgruber, 2009). Our findings are at odds with
our hypothesis that negative secondary emotion is the part of the meta-emotional experience that
is key to the association with depression. They suggest instead that the primary negative emotion
is just as important: i.e., that in accordance with the non-acceptance literature, NN metaemotional experiences are the only ones associated with depression.
Our findings regarding the frequency of meta-emotional experiences as well as their
associations with within- and between-person phenomena indicate that meta-emotional
experiences, as both a common and clinically significant phenomenon, are a valuable topic of
further research and discussion. Firstly, these data reinforce that we should focus on negative
emotions toward negative emotions in patients with depressive symptoms. Since cognitivebehavior therapy (CBT), which focuses on automatic thoughts and cognitive appraisals, is the
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leading treatment for depression (APA), it might be important to incorporate some component of
emotional reactions into traditional CBT treatment. Our data might also explain why
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is effective for preventing relapse in patients in
remission from MDD (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Piet & Hougaard, 2011): the
encouragement of acceptance of negative thoughts and feelings might help patients reduce NN
meta-emotional experiences. While patients might still experience negative emotions, they might
be less likely to experience a negative secondary emotional reaction. Further research could
examine the prevalence of NN meta-emotional experiences in patients in remission from MDD
who have undergone MBCT in comparison to those patients who have not undergone MBCT.
Our data on attention to emotion and clarity of emotion suggest that during moments
when individuals are not paying attention to their emotions and/or are less clear about their
emotions, they might either 1) not be experiencing meta-emotions or 2) be less able to recognize
and identify meta-emotional experiences. If the latter is the case, this could play an important
role in treatment settings: patients must first be able to identify when meta-emotional
experiences are occurring before they are able to reduce their occurrence. Our data particularly
support training patients in how to pay attention to their emotions. Once patients are paying
attention to their emotions, they will be better able to identify NN meta-emotions and to apply
acceptance strategies. However, it is worth emphasizing that in our current study, we relied
primarily on a self-report measure to assess depressive symptoms. Although our sample included
people with clinically significant levels of depression that were confirmed using diagnostic
interviewing, before we use our data to draw generalizations with regard to MDD, these findings
would need to be replicated with a group of participants who have been diagnosed with MDD.
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The findings from the current study build upon that literature in several ways. First, nonacceptance measures assess both negative appraisals of and negative emotions about other
emotions. Because our measure does not assess cognitive appraisals of emotions, our findings
provide evidence that the meta-emotion aspect of non-acceptance is associated with depression.
Of course, our data do not speak to the role of cognitive appraisal of the primary emotion and the
formation of a secondary emotion (Hofer & Wirth, 2012). Secondly, the non-acceptance
literature does not take into account other subtypes of meta-emotional experiences, implicitly
suggesting that NN is the subtype of most relevance to depression; this is consistent with our
findings. Finally, our use of experiential sampling serves to establish that it is not only trait metaemotional experience that is related to depression outcomes; momentary meta-emotional
experience is related to depression as well. The frequency with which an individual reports NN
meta-emotions on a day to day basis—not just a retrospective account of how he or she
“generally” reacts to his or her emotions—is associated with level of depression. This is
ostensibly a more compelling assertion, since ESM minimizes retrospective recall and increases
the accuracy of self-reports (Schwarz, 2011). Depressed individuals have been found to be even
more vulnerable to retrospective recall bias than are non-depressed individuals, as people who
are prone to experience negative affect tend to over-report negative affect during retrospective
recall (Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).
Our sample size was relatively large for an ESM study, but, as noted above, NP and PN
subtypes of meta-emotions were infrequently reported. Consequently, we had less power to
examine NP and PN meta-emotions. Future studies will need to recruit a larger sample in order
to draw more confident conclusions about the role of NP and PN meta-emotional experiences
and constructs of interest.
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Furthermore, the use of an open-ended to assess meta-emotional experiences, while
offering our study several novel strengths, entailed a few limitations. This format necessitated
participants typing responses. Some participants might not have always wanted to make that
extra effort. If this is the case, then our data underestimates the frequency of meta-emotional
experiences in daily life, and our results are conservative.
Another limitation was the number of responses that we needed to exclude based on our
coding of emotion words versus non-emotion words. The majority of these excluded responses
mentioned physical states or cognitive or behavioral states instead of feeling states. Some
participants reported clearly non-emotion words (e.g., “I feel really hot in temp about feeling
sluggish.”). Others might have possibly understood the concept to some degree, but used words
that were too vague to count as emotion words (e.g., “I feel strange about feeling these
feelings”). Participants who have trouble distinguishing exactly what they are feeling could
potentially have difficulties with emotion differentiation— i.e., the ability to separate emotions
into concrete categories such as anger versus sadness (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto,
2001; Boden et al., 2013). It is possible that we underestimated the number of people who were
actually experiencing meta-emotions but could not precisely label them (or the frequency with
which this occurred). Future research could examine the role of emotion differentiation in the
experience and reporting of meta-emotions.
Now that we have established norms of meta-emotional experiences in daily life and
begun to explore their relation with attention to and clarity of emotion, other emotion constructs
that might be associated with the occurrence of meta-emotional experiences should also be
explored—for example, as was mentioned earlier, emotion differentiation. It will also be
important to determine whether applying skills to reduce NN experiences helps alleviate
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depressive symptoms, and if so, whether acceptance and mindfulness are the most effective
strategies to use. Incorporating emotional awareness training that emphasizes both attending to
and understanding one’s emotions could potentially increase the effectiveness of any such
strategy. Ideally, taking meta-emotional experiences into account will allow us to better
understand, treat, and alleviate depressive symptomatology. Future research could also examine
the relation between meta-emotional experiences and other forms of psychopathology beyond
depression; for instance, it would be interesting to explore whether PP meta-emotional
experiences precede manic episodes in bipolar disorder, or whether PN meta-emotional
experiences are associated with rumination. There is a clear need for further research on the topic
of meta-emotional experiences, as those findings will hopefully illuminate our understanding of
emotion and psychopathology in general.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1. Within- and Between-Person Correlations Among Study Variables.
Measure
1
2
3
1. Attention
--0.48***
n/a
2. Clarity
0.13
--n/a
3. Depression
0.25*
-0.01
--Mean, SD
0.94 (0.77)
1.37 (0.59)
12.44 (9.51)
Note: Correlations above the diagonal are within-person correlations obtained from MLM
analyses (Nezlek, 2012). Within-person correlations for depression are not available because
depression was not assessed during experience sampling. Correlations below the diagonal are
between-person correlations calculated using mean scores.
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Table 2. Results of Logistic Models Predicting the Likelihood of
Experiencing Meta-Emotions at the Time of the Beep
Meta-Emotional Experience
Any Type
Positive-Positive
Positive-Negative
Negative-Positive
Negative-Negative
Note: 𝛾01 is displayed in logits.

𝛾01
0.05
0.02
-0.17
0.06
0.06

SE
0.02
0.04
0.12
0.05
0.02

Figure 1. Probability of having a negative-negative (NN)
meta-emotional experience as a function of depression
severity, as measured by the CES-D.
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p
0.02
0.53
0.14
0.20
<0.01

